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Research in social and personality psychology often bears 
directly on important political debates. Social–personality psy-
chologists have studied the nature of prejudice and discrimina-
tion (Allport, 1954), the origins of ideology (Jost, Glaser, 
Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003), and the intuitive underpinnings 
of people’s moral convictions (Haidt, 2001). Thus, the political 
beliefs of researchers can have large consequences for research. 
Critics have argued that social–personality psychologists are 
overwhelmingly politically liberal (left-wing) and that this lack 
of diversity leads to ideologically biased selection of research 
questions, selective interpretation of evidence, and even to dis-
crimination against conservative (right-wing) students and fac-
ulty (Haidt, 2011; Redding, 2001; Tetlock, 1994).
This issue seems to recur roughly every 10 years—most 
recently, in a provocative talk given by Jonathan Haidt (2011) 
at the annual meeting of the Society for Personality and Social 
Psychology (SPSP; APA Division 8). During his talk, Haidt 
asked the political conservatives present to raise their hands. 
In an audience of more than 1,000, only three hands went up. 
Haidt also described two other attempts he had made to locate 
conservatives in social psychology: searching the web using 
the term “conservative social psychologist” and asking 30 
social psychologists to name a conservative colleague. Com-
bined, these latter two methods uncovered one conservative 
social psychologist. Following earlier critics of psychology’s 
liberal bias, Haidt argued that this “statistically impossible 
lack of diversity” has serious negative consequences, includ-
ing the unwillingness to consider “taboo” hypotheses and 
discrimination against politically conservative students. Haidt 
suggested setting the explicit goal that 10% of SPSP members 
be political conservatives by 2020.
The Political Ideology of Social and 
Personality Psychologists
Whether one agrees or disagrees with this goal, it is clearly a 
problem that we know so few of the relevant facts. First, we 
have little reliable data on the political ideology of social– 
personality psychologists. Haidt’s (2011) demonstration 
shows that very few are willing to openly identify as conserva-
tive. However, the picture may be quite different when indi-
viduals are asked to report their attitudes privately and 
anonymously. Furthermore, the liberal–conservative dichot-
omy may mask a great deal of meaningful variation. For 
example, one might hold liberal views on social issues (e.g., 
skepticism regarding cultural traditions and sexual restrictive-
ness) but more conservative views on economic issues (e.g., 
opposition to regulation and wealth redistribution) (Ball & 
Bellamy, 2003; Duckitt, 2001; Jost et al., 2003; Lipset, 
1960/1981). A third important political domain is foreign pol-
icy, where conservatives tend to be hawks and liberals doves. 
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Abstract
A lack of political diversity in psychology is said to lead to a number of pernicious outcomes, including biased research 
and active discrimination against conservatives. We surveyed a large number (combined N = 800) of social and personality 
psychologists and discovered several interesting facts. First, although only 6% described themselves as conservative “overall,” 
there was more diversity of political opinion on economic issues and foreign policy. Second, respondents significantly 
underestimated the proportion of conservatives among their colleagues. Third, conservatives fear negative consequences 
of revealing their political beliefs to their colleagues. Finally, they are right to do so: In decisions ranging from paper reviews 
to hiring, many social and personality psychologists said that they would discriminate against openly conservative colleagues. 
The more liberal respondents were, the more they said they would discriminate.
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This domain has received less attention from psychologists, 
but international security is among the most important criteria 
on which voters evaluate politicians (Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987; 
Mueller, 1986; Rosenwasser & Seale, 1988). Our first aim, 
therefore, was to assess the ideology of social–personality 
psychologists in each of these three domains and overall.
Accuracy in Perceived Ideology
Our second aim was to determine whether our respondents 
accurately perceived the ideology of their colleagues. There 
are several reasons to expect systematic inaccuracy. First, peo-
ple generally believe that other members of their in-group 
are more extreme in their opinions than they themselves are. 
That is, people often believe that they form the more moderate 
part of a group (Keltner & Robinson, 1996; Robinson, Keltner, 
Ward, & Ross, 1995). Second, when people perceive a strong 
social norm—such as the norm of political liberalism among 
psychologists—they often do not express their (private) dis-
agreement with it, without realizing that other people may be 
doing the same thing. The result is a norm that is seen as much 
more widely supported than it actually is (Prentice & Miller, 
1996).
Reasons for Conservative 
Underrepresentation
To foreshadow our findings, there is more ideological diver-
sity among social–personality psychologists than our respon-
dents think—that is, they overestimate the field’s liberalism. 
In fact, conservatives seem to be a well-hidden minority. But 
why would conservatives hide their views? One salient expla-
nation is a hostile political climate against conservatives (and 
even moderates). Nonliberals may feel unable to publicly 
express their views, and the liberal majority may actively dis-
criminate against openly conservative individuals.
Obvious as this explanation might seem, it is not uncontro-
versial. For example, Gilbert (2011) argued that in the absence 
of data showing discrimination against conservatives, an equally 
plausible explanation for liberal overrepresentation is self-
selection, as “liberals may be more interested in new ideas, 
more willing to work for peanuts, or just more intelligent, all of 
which may push them to pursue the academic life while deter-
ring their conservative peers.” Similarly, Jacquet (2011) specu-
lated that “there are very few conservatives in social psychology 
possibly not because it’s a hostile environment but because the 
field of social psychology self-selects for liberals and might 
even create them.” We do not doubt that self-selection may play 
some role (see Gross & Fosse, 2012), and we agree that the 
field’s liberal tilt is, on logical grounds, not enough to conclu-
sively show a hostile climate or discrimination against conser-
vatives (although such large statistical disparities are legally 
considered prima facie evidence of discrimination; Teamsters v. 
United States, 1977). We therefore investigated whether conser-
vative social–personality psychologists do indeed experience a 
hostile climate and whether the more liberal might be willing to 
actively discriminate against their conservative colleagues.
Summary and Overview
In sum, we set out to answer three questions. First, how left-
wing is the political ideology of social–personality psycholo-
gists? Second, do social–personality psychologists accurately 
perceive the ideology of their colleagues? Third, is there a per-
ceived or actual hostile climate for—or even willingness to 
discriminate against—conservative social–personality psy-
chologists? To answer these three questions, we contacted all 
1,939 members of the SPSP electronic mailing list and invited 
them to complete two brief online surveys.
Survey 1
Survey 1’s primary purpose was to assess the political ideol-
ogy of social–personality psychologists on social issues, eco-
nomic issues, and foreign policy. We asked respondents to 
report their ideology (rather than asking about specific policy 
questions) because self-rated ideology is highly predictive of 
attitudes on specific issues (see Jost, 2006), because it allows 
straightforward classification of respondents (as liberal, mod-
erate, or conservative), because it facilitates international 
comparisons, and because it maximizes response (by minimiz-
ing survey length).
Respondents
Of those contacted, 508 individuals participated (mean age = 
36.8 years; 53.6% of the sample was female). This response 
rate (26.2% of those contacted) is close to that observed in 
previous studies using similar methods (e.g., Klein & Stern, 
2005). Compared with the demographics of the entire SPSP 
membership in 2011 (gender, age, and country of residence), 
our sample represented the population quite well (see supple-
mentary analyses in the Appendix).
Political ideology
Respondents were asked whether they considered themselves 
to be (1) Very liberal, (2) Liberal, (3) Somewhat liberal,  
(4) Moderate, (5) Somewhat conservative, (6) Conservative, 
or (7) Very conservative separately for “social issues,” “eco-
nomic issues,” and “foreign policy.” As expected, respondents 
were liberal on average in all three domains. Yet as Figure 1 
shows, we found an overwhelmingly liberal majority only on 
social issues: Here only a handful of respondents described 
themselves as moderate (5.5%) or conservative (3.9%). But in 
the two other domains, we found a considerable amount of 
diversity. On economic issues, 18.9% were moderates and 
17.9% were conservative (i.e., right of Moderate). Similarly, 
on foreign policy, 21.1% were moderates and 10.3% were 
conservative.
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Correlations between self-ratings in each domain were 
medium to large, positive, and significant (all ps < .001). Eco-
nomic conservatism correlated with social conservatism at r = 
.53 and with foreign-policy conservatism at r = .67; social and 
foreign-policy conservatism correlated at r = .53.
Others’ ideology
On a separate page, respondents used the same scales to rate 
their beliefs about the attitudes of the average social–personal-
ity psychologist in their country of residence.1 As Figure 1 
shows, participants believed the average social–personality 
psychologist to be more liberal than they themselves were on 
economic issues, Mself = 3.1, Mother = 2.9, F(1, 501) = 11.02, 
p = .001, d = .21. This was also true for foreign policy, Mself = 
2.9, Mother = 2.6, F(1, 498) = 18.88, p < .001, d = .27. Only for 
social issues were perceptions of the average opinion accurate, 
Mself = 2.1, Mother = 2.1, F(1, 502) = 1.57, p = .21. (Variations 
in degrees of freedom across these questions are due to miss-
ing data.)
Summary
Social–personality psychologists are more ideologically 
diverse than they think. Although conservatives are a minority, 
they are a substantial minority on economic issues and foreign 
policy. It is important to note that ideology in the latter two 
domains has important consequences for psychological 
research. When Tetlock (1994) argued that the lack of political 
diversity leads to biased research, his two examples of such 
(putatively) ideologically biased research mapped onto these 
domains: White’s (1984) work on deterrence in international 
relations; and research on modern racism, which Tetlock 
argued improperly defined opposition to government regula-
tion and subsidies as racist.
On both economics and foreign policy, respondents overes-
timated the liberalism of their colleagues. In our second 
survey, we examined why this might be the case—in other 
words, why the conservative minority might be hard to see. 
Specifically, we investigated whether more conservative social– 
personality psychologists conceal their views for fear of nega-
tive consequences. We also investigated whether these fears 
might be well founded.
Survey 2
Six months after our initial data collection, we again contacted 
all members of the SPSP electronic mailing list. We briefly 
describe the measures below along with the results. For the 
full version of each measure, please see the online supplemen-
tal materials at http://pps.sagepub.com/supplemental.
Respondents
Of those contacted, 292 individuals participated (mean age = 
38 years; 58% of the sample was female). Complete data 
including demographics were obtained from 266. (Lower par-
ticipation compared with Survey 1 is probably due to the fact 
that Survey 2 was described as taking 10 minutes rather than 
3.) In the analyses, we used data from all participants who 
answered the relevant question(s), so degrees of freedom vary. 
As in Survey 1, our sample’s demographics reflected those of 
the SPSP membership (see Table 1).
Political ideology
We measured political ideology with the same seven-point 
measures as in Survey 1 but now also added a fourth, “over-
all,” item. As in Survey 1, there was a conservative minority 
that was largest for economic issues and foreign policy (see 
Fig. 2), indicating that the two samples are comparable. In the 
following analyses, we use participants’ ratings of themselves 
“overall” as our primary measure of political ideology. For all 
analyses, combining all political ideology ratings into one 
composite measure (α = .91) yields nearly identical results.
Hostile climate
We asked respondents how much they felt a hostile climate 
toward their political beliefs in their field, whether they were 
reluctant to express their political beliefs to their colleagues 
for fear of negative consequences, and whether they thought 
Table 1. Demographics (%) for Each Survey and the Entire SPSP 
Membership
Demographic
Survey 1  
(n = 508)
Survey 2  
(n = 266)
All SPSP  
(N = 7,583)
Gender
 Female 53.6 57.4 55.5
Age
 18–24 4.0 0.4 17.2
 25–34 49.4 50.7 46.0
 35–44 27.4 26.7 18.0
 45–54 10.0 11.3 8.4
 55–64 5.8 6.4 6.4
 65+ 3.4 4.5 4.0
Nationality
 Canada 8.2 7.5 7.5
 Europe/U.K. 8.4 8.3 11.5
 U.S. 81.1 80.5 72.5
Position
 Tenured faculty 27.5 30.5
 Tenure track faculty 19.8 23.4
 Other faculty 4.2 6.3
 Postdoc 9.4 7.8
 Graduate student 33.5 26.4 36.4
 Govt./Industry 2.4 1.9
Note. The Society for Personality and Social Psychology (SPSP) classifies 
members as “Undergraduate,” “Graduate,” or “Member”; thus, the only 
statistics available for comparison purposes in position demographic in the 
overall SPSP sample are for those classified as graduate students.
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colleagues would actively discriminate against them on the 
basis of their political beliefs (all responses were on a seven-
point scale: 1 = Not at all, 4 = Somewhat, 7 = Very much). 
Scores on a composite of these three questions (α = .93) 
correlated significantly with political orientation, r(289) = .50, 
p < .0001: The more conservative respondents were, the more 
they had personally experienced a hostile climate. Treating 
ideology as a categorical variable, conservatives experienced 
a significantly more hostile climate (M = 4.7) than did liberals 

























Fig. 1. Political diversity by domain (Survey 1). Histogram bars show response counts; the solid lines show the true 
sample mean, and the dotted lines show what participants imagined the mean to be. Pie charts show responses recoded 
as “liberal” (1–3), “moderate” (4), and “conservative” (5–7).
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t(30.43) = 2.06, p = .05. Moderates also experienced a more 
hostile climate compared with liberals, t(26.10) = 5.40, p < 
.0001.
Perceived hostile climate for conservatives
We asked respondents whether they felt that there was a hos-
tile climate toward the political beliefs of social–personality 
psychologists “who would rate themselves as ‘somewhat con-
servative,’ ‘conservative,’ or ‘very conservative’ overall.” We 
used the same three hostile climate questions as above but 
with “conservative social–personality psychologists” as the 
target. Composite scores of perceived hostile climate for con-
servatives (α = .85) were significantly correlated with political 
orientation, r(263) = .28, p < .0001: The more liberal respon-
dents were, the less they believed that conservatives faced a 
hostile climate. This correlation was driven entirely by more 
conservative respondents’ greater personal experience of a 
hostile climate: Controlling for personal experience, the rela-
tionship disappeared (r = −.01), suggesting that the hostile 
climate reported by conservatives is invisible to those who do 
not experience it themselves.
Stated willingness to discriminate
Participants answered four questions assessing their stated 
willingness to discriminate against conservatives. The first 
two questions asked whether, when a participant was review-
ing a grant application or paper, a feeling that it took a “politi-
cally conservative perspective” would negatively influence 
the decision to award the grant or accept the paper for publica-
tion. The third asked whether the participant would be reluc-
tant to invite “a colleague who is generally known to be 
politically quite conservative” to participate in a symposium 
(on an unspecified topic). The fourth question asked whether, 
in choosing between two equally qualified job candidates for 
one job opening, the participant would be inclined to vote for 
the more liberal candidate (over the conservative). For each of 
these four questions, respondents also indicated whether they 
thought that other members of their department would be will-
ing to discriminate against conservatives. All responses were 
on seven-point scales (1 = Not at all, 4 = Somewhat, 7 = Very 
much). For each question, means differed significantly from 1, 
and a substantial percentage of respondents chose the scale 
midpoint (Somewhat) or above (see Table 2). Furthermore, 
the more liberal respondents were, the more they said they were 
willing to discriminate against conservatives on each question: 
paper reviews, r(279) = −.32, p < .0001; grant reviews, r(280) = 
−.34, p < .0001; symposium invitations, r(277) = −.20, p = 
.001; hiring decisions, r(279) = −.44, p < .0001.
General Discussion
Like most scientists (Cardiff & Klein, 2005), social and per-
sonality psychologists are on average more liberal than the 
general population (Gallup, 2010). Yet we also find in two 
studies that their political ideology is more diverse than often 
assumed. On economics and foreign policy, a sizeable minor-
ity described themselves as moderate or conservative. Indeed, 
although only 6% described themselves as conservative “over-
all,” on economic and international affairs our sample already 
meets or exceeds the 10% “quota” that Haidt (2011) suggested 
as a 10-year target for ideological diversity. Why, then, did 
Haidt have such difficulty finding more than a handful of con-
servative colleagues? The current results suggest one answer: 
Members of the conservative minority are reluctant to express 
their political beliefs publicly. Survey 2 shows why: Hostility 
toward and willingness to discriminate against conservatives 
is widespread. One in six respondents said that she or he would 
be somewhat (or more) inclined to discriminate against con-
servatives in inviting them for symposia or reviewing their 








Fig. 2. Political diversity by domain (Survey 2). Responses are recoded as 
“liberal” (1–3), “moderate” (4), and “conservative” (5–7).
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applications. More than one in three would discriminate 
against them when making hiring decisions. Thus, willingness 
to discriminate is not limited to small decisions. In fact, it is 
strongest when it comes to the most important decisions, such 
as grant applications and hiring. This hostile climate offers a 
simple explanation of why conservatives hide their political 
opinions from colleagues. Given that all academics depend on 
the opinions of their colleagues—who judge their papers, 
grants, and job applications—and given that such judgments 
are typically made by multiple reviewers (most of whom are 
liberal), this means that outspoken conservatives face a very 
serious problem. Hence, the more conservative respondents 
are, the more they hide their political opinions.
Limitations
One might argue that our discrimination questions overstate 
respondents’ willingness to discriminate, because we asked 
only whether they would evaluate papers and grant applica-
tions that seemed to take a conservative perspective nega-
tively, not how they would evaluate work with a liberal 
perspective. That is, perhaps any political perspective is seen 
as improper. Three things speak against this: First, there is a 
priori no reason to believe that objections to taking a political 
perspective per se should be correlated with ideology, yet we 
find a strong correlation. Liberals are much more negative 
toward work with a conservative perspective. Second, the 
paper and grant review questions correlate positively with the 
other two discrimination questions (rs > .45), which are not 
susceptible to this alternative explanation: Research should be 
neutral, but researchers need not be. Finally, it is easier to 
detect bias in material that opposes one’s beliefs than in mate-
rial that supports it (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979). Work that 
supports liberal politics may thus seem unremarkable, whereas 
work that supports conservatism is seen as improperly ideo-
logical. There is also the more subtle possibility that respon-
dents interpreted “conservative social psychologist” as 
describing a conservative activist bent on promoting a politi-
cal agenda.2 We cannot rule this out entirely, but we should 
note that we also asked participants for comments (see below), 
and none advanced this interpretation.
We believe it even more plausible that our measures under-
estimate willingness to discriminate, because respondents 
were asked directly and because presumably there is a strong 
norm against discrimination among psychologists. Consistent 
with this, perceived willingness to discriminate was even 
stronger when people were asked about the behavior of their 
peers—an indirect measure that bypasses some social desir-
ability concerns.
There is good reason to believe that the results of these two 
surveys can be generalized to social–personality psychology 
as a whole: On important demographics—age, gender, and 
nationality—our sample is quite similar to the entire SPSP 
membership. This close correspondence suggests that it is 
unlikely that nonresponders systematically differed from 
responders, although we cannot rule out this possibility 
entirely (we should note that this is the case for any survey 
research; see, e.g., Keeter, Kennedy, Dimock, Best, & 
Craighill, 2006). We also looked for—and were unable to 
find—differences between those who described their area as 
primarily or exclusively “social psychology” and those who 
described it as primarily or exclusively “personality psychol-
ogy.” The findings described here thus seem to be equally 
descriptive of psychologists in both areas (although limited, of 
course, to those who are SPSP members).
What about other areas within psychology? Here we have 
little firm empirical evidence. Cardiff and Klein (2005) obtained 
the political party registrations of 4,563 California faculty and 
found that among all psychology faculty (N = 295), Democrats 
outnumbered Republicans at a ratio of 8:1. This might seem 
high, but in Survey 2, we found a liberal to conservative ratio of 
almost 14:1 (for ratings of ideology “overall”). Keeping in mind 
the inherent problems of comparing these two very different 
samples (and of assuming that “liberal” and “conservative” self-
descriptions are reliable proxies for Democratic and Republican 
voter registration), this comparison suggests that social–person-
ality psychologists might be even more liberal on average than 
psychologists overall.
Table 2. Stated Willingness to Discriminate Against Conservatives
Self           Colleagues
Item M (SD)
Percentage of  
responses ≥4 M (SD)
Percentage of 
responses ≥4
Paper review 2.4 (1.3) 18.6 3.0 (1.5) 34.2
Grant review 2.5 (1.3) 23.8 3.0 (1.5) 36.9
Symposium invite 2.1 (1.3) 14.0 2.7 (1.5) 29.6
Hiring decision 2.9 (1.7) 37.5 3.4 (1.7) 44.1
Note. All ratings were on scales from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Very much), with the midpoint labeled 4 (Some-
what).  All means differ significantly from 1 (ps < .001).
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Implications
Is it a problem that conservative political opinion is not toler-
ated? If one believes that conservatives are simply wrong, per-
haps not. After all, geologists are not obliged to accept 
colleagues who believe the earth is flat. But political or moral 
beliefs often do not have a truth value. A belief that the earth is 
flat is factually false; a belief that abortion should be prohib-
ited is not. Neither is a belief that cultural traditions should be 
respected or that economic inequality is acceptable. It may 
also be that many aspects of conservative thinking can serve as 
inspiration for interesting research questions that would other-
wise be missed. Finally, as offensive as it may seem to many 
(liberal) social psychologists, believing that abortion is mur-
der does not mean that one cannot do excellent research.
But what is perhaps the most important issue—an issue that 
we believe most psychologists, regardless of political back-
ground, will find troubling—is that conservatives are barred 
from discussion and are forced to keep their political opinion 
to themselves, coupled with a denial of the severity of this 
issue. We found this in our quantitative data, as described in 
this article. But perhaps even more telling is what we found in 
our qualitative data. At the end of our surveys, we gave room 
for comments. Many respondents wrote that they could 
not believe that anyone in the field would ever deliberately 
discriminate against conservatives. Yet at the same time we 
found clear examples of discrimination. One participant 
described how a colleague was denied tenure because of his 
political beliefs. Another wrote that if the department “could 
figure out who was a conservative they would be sure not to 
hire them.” Various participants described how colleagues 
silenced them during political discussions because they had 
voted Republican. One participant wrote that “it causes me 
great stress to not be able to have an environment where open 
dialogue is acceptable. Although most colleagues talk about 
tolerance, and some are, there are a few vociferous voices that 
make for a closed environment.” Some respondents wrote 
that at times they felt reluctant to ask certain questions 
because these hinted at a conservative identity. But an envi-
ronment that stimulates open discussion and where hypothe-
ses may be raised regardless of their political implications can 
only benefit our field. Even those who fundamentally dis-
agree with conservatism will agree that silencing political 
opponents will not convert them. By excluding those who 
disagree with (most of) us politically, we treat them unfairly, 
do ourselves a disservice, and ultimately damage the scien-
tific credibility of our field.
Appendix
Representativeness of samples
We compared the demographics of our sample with the demo-
graphics of the entire SPSP membership in 2011 (N = 7,583). 
Age (coded categorically) was available for 6,696 SPSP mem-
bers, gender was available for 7,014, and country of residence 
was available for the entire group. Both our samples matched 
the SPSP membership well on gender and nationality (see 
Table 1). On age, our samples generally matched the age dis-
tribution of the SPSP membership, with the exception of 
underrepresenting those under 24. This is likely due to the 
absence of undergraduate students (6.4% of the SPSP mem-
bership) from our sample, as well as undersampling of younger 
graduate students (graduate students as a whole make up 
36.4% of the SPSP membership but only 33.5% and 26.4% of 
Survey 1 and 2 respondents, respectively).
Survey 1: Additional analyses
Although not central to our predictions, we also found that 
Americans rated themselves as more conservative on foreign 
policy than did residents of other countries, F(3, 497) = 3.59, 
p = .01, but not on social or economic issues (all Fs < 1). We 
also found that women were more liberal than men in all 
domains (all ps < .005). We found no effect of age (all ps > 
.10), academic position (all ps > .2), or academic area (all ps > 
.18) in any domain. We also did not find that faculty and stu-
dents rated themselves as more liberal at more prestigious 
institutions than at four-year colleges (all ps > .14).
Survey 2: Additional analyses
As in Study 1, women rated themselves as more liberal than 
men in all domains as well as overall (all ps < .06). Age was 
weakly associated with greater conservatism overall, r(265) = 
.12, p = .05; this relationship was positive but not significant 
for the three subdomains (rs between .08 and .11). There was 
no effect of academic position (all ps > .13) or academic area 
(social, personality, social–personality, or other; all ps > .35) 
on political ideology in any domain or overall. Using the insti-
tution’s U.S. News & World Report ranking (reported by 
respondents as “top 10,” “10–20,” “20–50,” “50–100,” and 
“100+” and recoded as a continuous variable) as a proxy for 
institution prestige, we examined whether affiliates of more 
prestigious institutions rated themselves as more liberal in any 
domain or overall. This was not the case (rs from −.07 to .03, 
all ps > .3).
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Notes
1. We randomized whether respondents first rated their own atti-
tudes or others’. Question order did not affect any results.
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